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In the history of control and supervision in Indonesia, 20 March 2000 is one 
more important date. That day many printing as well as electronic media in Jakarta 
reported and broadcasted the inauguration of the eight Ombudsmen of Indonesia in 
the Palace of the President of the Republic. Undoubtedly, for most Indonesian 
people’s ears until then, even up to now, the word “ombudsman” is still 
undecipherable word. Whereas it is certain, the ombudsman system is one of the 
symbols of democracy respecting and promoting the rule of law. As a result, one 
cannot find any precedent in the history of modern democracy about the abolishing of 
an Ombudsman Institution.1   On the contrary, some national statesneglecting the 
rule of law and governed by authoritarian and undemocratic rulersestablished the 
Ombudsman Institutions to pursue international sympathies for having false image as 
democratic governments respecting the rule of law and human rights. Also it is 
recorded, that once the Parliament of Malawi rejected the Bill of the National 
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Ombudsman. Sometime later, however, the Ombudsman Office was established after 
the enacting of the Ombudsman Act.2 
 
Two years after getting its independence from Kingdom of Sweden, in the end 
of 1919, Finland established Ombudsman Office. It is the second Ombudsman 
Institution in the world. Nonetheless, not until 7 February of the following year, the 
first letter of grievance came in to the new Office. Hence, the date became the 
birthdate of the Finish National Ombudsman. 3   On the contrary, in the case of 
Indonesia, many people phoned the Chief Ombudsman candidate asking when the 
Office would be established. The first grievance to the Komisi Ombudsman Nasional, 
or the National Ombudsman Commission on the first day of its operation was lodged 
by the Colonel (Ret.) dr. Rudy Hendrawijaya, MPH. It was about the case involving 
the judiciary. He reported that there were two judgements of the Supreme Court of 
Indonesia for his case. In the first one, the Court rejected the cassation appeal lodged 
by the opponent party. This meant, the complainant won the case. In the second one, 
however, the Court agreed to review the case and gave its own judgement by which the 
complainant becomes the loser of the case. The complainant is of the opinion that the second 
judgement (No.1082 K/Pid/1988 of 16 November 1999) is none other than a forgery.4  
 
 
I. The Spreading of Ombudsmanship 
 
Sweden is the homeland of the modern ombudsman. Exactly it was established 
in 1809. Before the establishment of the Finish Ombudsman, for more than 100 years 
the ombudsman institution had been known only in Sweden. Then, in the second half 
of the last century, it spread all over the world with the Ombudsman Office of New 
Zealand as the first in the English speaking countries and outside Europe. Seven years 
earlier, in 1955, Denmark established the Folketingets Ombudsmand, or 
Parliamentary Ombudsman.5    This is the third Ombudsman in the Scandinavian 
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countries with emphasized on the maladministration and the oversight of the public 
service, excluding the oversight of the judiciary. Sometime later it was followed by 
Norway and Iceland. 
 
In West and South Europe, the Ombudsman Offices were established in the 
Republic of Ireland, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greek, 
Malta, Portugal, and Spain. In East and Central Europe, the Offices were established 
in Slovenia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Albany and Rumania. It 
will be soon established in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria.6 
 
In the beginning the United Kingdom was skeptical about the Nordic 
institution. However, an Ombudsman Office called the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administration was established later in London (1967) followed by other similar 
ombudsmen of particular public sector such as the Independent Housing Ombudsman, 
the Police Complaints Authority, the Prison Ombudsman, and the Data Protection 
Registrar.7  In France, knowing that its administrative court system was the most 
effective in Europe, many people opposed to the Ombudsman concept.8  At last, a 
variant of parliamentary ombudsman was established in Paris by the name of 
Médiateur de la République,9  by emphasizing mediation as its method of work. The 
francophone countries then followed this model. 10   Meanwhile, the Ombudsman 
Office of New Zealand has become the model of the commonwealth countries.11 
 
In North America, Ombudsman Offices were established in some Provinces of 
Canada. The Ombudsman Office of Hawaii is the first State Ombudsman in the 
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United States. 12   Whereas in Latin America, the first Ombudsman Office is 
established in Guatemala.13 
 
In Asia, the modern Ombudsman was first introduced in India, and there are 
eleven local ombudsmen, or Lok Ayukta. 14   In Pakistan the modern National 
Ombudsman, the Wafaqi Mohtasib, has been in existence since 1986. Whereas in 
Africa, the first Ombudsman Office established is the one in Tanzania.15 
 
Nowadays there are already 107 National Ombudsmen in the world with the 
National Ombudsman of Thailand is the last. It was established on 1 April 2000 or 
eleven days after the Indonesian Ombudsman Commission was born. 
 
It is worth of notice, that the word of “Ombudsman” has been protected by 
International Ombudsman Institute (IOI). The protection is intended to give criteria 
for the membership of that International Organization due to the growth use of the 
word “Ombudsman” by similar institutions, which are not really independent.  Other 
criteria are whether or not the institutions screened having: impartiality, immunity, 
powers of investigation and authorities to make recommendation.16 
 
 
II. Parliamentary Ombudsman vs. Executive Ombudsman 
 
The Swedish word of ombud means “legal representative”. The word and 
function of “ombudsman” has been very popular there. Hence, the trade unions, 
political parties, public as well as private corporations have their own ombudsman. 
However, the most independent ombudsman in Sweden is the parliamentary 
ombudsman called justitieombudsman, or “JO”.17 
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The authority of the justitieombudsman (the ombudsman of justice) is to 
oversee the application of law by the public service, military, and judiciary. Whenever 
there is diversion of law or apparently there is abuse of power, the JO will investigate 
it and give the recommendation and even it may prosecute the particular bureaucrat, 
military officer and judge who has allegedly violated the law or abused of authority. 
At the same time, those who think they have been the victims of malfeasance may 
lodge complain to the JO.18 
 
The JO is a parliamentary ombudsman since he sends special as well as annual 
report to the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) that elected him. Most ombudsmen in the 
world are parliamentary ombudsmen. The variants of it are found in some countries, 
where the ombudsmen are appointed by the Head of State (the King, the Queen or the 
President). Still, they are responsible to and send the report to the Parliament. For 
example, the Queen appoints the Parliamentary Commissioner, or the English 
Ombudsman, on the advice of the Prime Minister after consulting the leaders of the 
opposition parties.19 
 
There are, however, ombudsmen elected by the Head of State and they send 
the report to the Head of State, not to the Parliament. Hence, they are executive 
ombudsmen. Ombudsmen of the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Indonesia and Tunisia 
belong to this group. The variant of it is the French Ombudsman, or le médiateur de la 
République that is appointed by the Cabinet. Also he sends report to the Head of state. 
Without having full independence, still the executive ombudsmen play significant role 
in protecting rights of the public and to improve the rigid application of regulation and 
practices.20 
 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 The credit should be given to Professor Roy Gregory, Reading University, England, UK, who 
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One should notice, it is one of the universal principles of ombudsmanship that 
no one or no other institutionnot even the Parliament (in case of a parliamentary 
ombudsman) or the President (in case of an executive ombudsman)may intervene, 
instruct, and dictate ombudsman. Thus “responsible” in the context of 
ombudsmanship means that he has to send the special as well as annual report.21 
 
As previously mentioned, the other Scandinavian countries later adopted the 
Swedish Classic Ombudsman. As a matter of fact, the West and South European 
countries did not adopt the Swedish model genuinely. They adopted the parliamentary 
ombudsman of Denmark instead. Without having the power of prosecution and 
without having the authority of scrutinizing the judiciary, the Danish Ombudsman 
oversees the bureaucracy and public administration.22 
 
In later development, some Ombudsman Offices extended their jurisdiction 
encompassing the power to investigate and prosecute corruption practices. This 
extension of power may be seen in the Philippines, Vanuatu, Ghana, Namibia, Sudan, 
Uganda, and Zambia. In other words, these offices have shifted from the position of 
the “Magistrature of Influence” into the “Magistrature of Sanctions”.23 
 
Other variant, the extension of jurisdiction may be seen in Latin America inter 
alia in Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, 
Argentina, Peru and Bolivia. They established the so-called “Human Rights 
Ombudsman”, since the Offices have jurisdiction to investigate the human rights as 
well as maladministration violations.24 
 
The Ombudsman Offices in the East and Central European countries took the 
similar path. Meanwhile, unlike many Ombudsman Offices in some African countries, 
the Ombudsman Offices in Latin America and in East and Central Europe are not 
vested with the power to investigate corruption practices. However, all those 
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ombudsmen are categorized as the second generation. Many of them called 
themselves as the “Human Rights Commission” or any other titles among other things 
are: Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Civil Rights 
Protector, Public Protector, Le Protecteur du Citoyen, Commission Nationale de Droit 
de l’Homme, Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Procurador para la Defensa 
de los Derechos Humanos, Defensor del Pueblo, Defensor de los Habitantes, 
Difensore Civico, and Provedor de Justiça. 25   Whereas the first generation of 
ombudsmen are those classical ombudsmen that are responsible to scrutinize the 
public administration.26 
 
III. The National Ombudsman Commission of Indonesia 27 
 
Most National Ombudsmen in the world were established by an Act. On the 
other hand, the National Ombudsman Commission of Indonesia was established based 
on the Presidential Decree Number 44 of the Year 2000.  As previously mentioned, on 
20 March 2000, the eight Anggota (Member), or Commissioners (Ombudsmen), were 
inaugurated by President Abdurrahman Wahid in the Palace in Jakarta. The position 
of the ninth Commissioner is still vacant. Few months later three Commissioners 
resigned and one of them became the Chief Justice of Indonesia. Now therefore there 
are four vacancies for the position of Commissioner. 
 
It is worth of notice, that similar to the Ombudsman Commission of Indonesia, 
the National Ombudsman Office of Pakistan too was created by a Presidential Decree 
(President’s Order Number 1) in 1983. 28   Both Ombudsmen are appointed and 
responsible to the President of the Republic. Hence, both of them are not 
Parliamentary Ombudsmen. 
 
                                                 
25 See Directory 2000 of International Ombudsman Institute; cf. Daniel Jacoby, “[Report of the] 
International Ombudsman Institution Board of Directors’ Meeting”, in the 7th International 
Ombudsman Institute, Durban, South Africa, 30 October to 2 November 2000. 
26 Cf. Jacoby “[Report of the]”. 
27 Cf. Surachman, “Institusi Ombudsman”. 
28 See Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983; also Annual 
Report 1999 (Islamabad: Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman)’s Secretariat, 1999), p.4 and pp.138-149. 
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As have been seen, some parliamentary ombudsmen are appointed by the 
Head of State (the King, the Queen or the President). They are responsible to and send 
the report to the Parliament and yet they are autonomous and independent.29 
 
Accordingly, either the Ombudsman of Pakistan or the Ombudsman of 
Indonesia will become a Parliamentary Ombudsman, if each of the Presidential 
Decree mandates each of the Ombudsman to send the report to the Parliament. 
 
Indonesia, however, will not amend the Presidential Decree for two reasons. 
Firstly, the Ombudsman Commission has composed the Draft of the Bill on the 
National Ombudsman. The preparing of the Draft is one of the mandates provisioned 
in the Presidential Decree. Secondly, the Ombudsman Commission has decided that it 
is the Indonesian Parliament, not the Head of State that will elect the future National 
Ombudsman. 
 
It does not mean that the Indonesian Ombudsman Commission will become 
political partisan. The choice is motivated solely for gaining political support from the 
Parliament. In that condition, the National Ombudsman of Indonesia will hold a 
stronger position and will be more independent and impartial. What is more, being an 
outsider of the Executive, it will become an autonomous supervision institution. 
Needless to say, the Act of Indonesian Ombudsman as legal basis will be stronger 
than the present Presidential Decree. 
 
 
IV. The Objective and the Mandates 
 
As a matter of fact, the establishment of Ombudsman Commission was one of 
the commitments of the President Abdurrahman Wahid Administration (and 
continued by the present Administration under the leadership of President Megawati 
Soekarnoputri) to reform the laws and institutions in pursuing a better and clean 
administration and to enhance the realization of good governance. In other words, the 
establishment of the Commission is to prevent those authorities in public sector from 
                                                 
29 Supra n. 18. 
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abusing of authority and discretion; to assist them in performing their jobs effectively 
and efficiently; and to compel them for maintaining the accountability and fairness. 
 
For those purposes the Ombudsman Commission was given the following 
mandates described under the Presidential Decree Number 44/2000:30 
(1) To accommodate the social participation in conditioning the realization 
of clean and simple bureaucracies, good public service, professional 
and efficient justice administration as well as impartial and fair trial by 
independent judiciary. 
(2) To promote the protection of individuals in getting public service, 
justice and welfare and in defending their rights against illegal actions 
and irregular practices resulting from abuse of power, corruption, 
collusion, discrimination, undue delay, deviation and improper 
discretion. 
(3) To enhance the supervision of the government institutions and agencies 
including the judiciary by sending clarifications, queries, and 
recommendations to those reported institutions and agencies (target 
groups), followed by uninterrupted monitoring of their compliance 
with the recommendations. 
(4) To prepare the transforming of the Ombudsman Commission into a 
more effective, autonomous, and completely independent 
Parliamentary Ombudsman of Indonesia by drafting the Bill on the 
National Ombudsman to be submitted to the Legislature within six (6) 
months. 
 
In this context, the Ombudsman Commission practises these procedural 
activities: if it is discovered that there is a kind of maladministration committed by 
any government institution or agency in the form of undue delayed, inappropriate and 
arbitrary decision, actions, omissions, or deviation or apparently it is a result of abuse 
of discretion, and abuse of power, or it is in contradiction with law and regulations, 
the Ombudsman Commission will give recommendation to the target groups (the 
                                                 
30 See Laporan Tahunan 2000/2000 Annual Report (N.p.: Komisi Ombudsman Nasional, 2001), p.6 
and p.7. See also Arts 3-4 of Presidential Decree Number 44 of the Year 2000. 
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reported institution or agency) that the case is under the monitoring. Even if on the 
surface it is legal or not in contradiction with law and regulations, the Ombudsman 
Commission will do the same. Accordingly, it is possible for the Ombudsman 
Commission to dispose the case based on equity.31 
 
In short, the immediate objective of Ombudsman Commission is inter alia to 
pursue the realization of the clean and effective bureaucracies in providing good 
services to the public based on the supremacy of law as well as the realization of the 
professional and credible law enforcement agencies including the accountable and 
independent judiciary that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
maintain equal opportunity and justice for all.32 
 
In other words, the public institutions and agencies concerned are at least 
willing to accept and recognize the existence of the Ombudsman Commission. Further, 
those institutions and agencies will soon realize that a new institution of 
accountability and integrity i.e. the Ombudsman Commission now controls their 
works. 
 
The long range objective of the Ombudsman Commission is inter alia to 
pursue the realization of good governance in the context of civil democracy based on 
the rule of law and supported by a strong judiciary that respect the principle of 
equality before the law, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.33 
 
The influx of complainants to see the Chief Ombudsman for reporting their 
grievances reflect the wishful expectations of the people, that the Ombudsman 
Commission is completely independent and vested with broad authorities. They 
believe they have found the real protector for their rights and interest. They believe 
the Ombudsman Commission may provide the last opportunity to get redress and 
                                                 
31 RM Surachman, Commissioner (Ombudsman) of the National Ombudsman Commission, Address 
to Workshop on Administrative Law, Surabaya, October, p.2. 
32 Laporan Tahunan 2000/2000 Annual Report, p.6 and p.7. 
33 Ibid., p.8 and p.9. 
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remedies for their rights which have been damaged, dishonored, abrogated, or even 
abolished by the unfair authorities and impartial judges.34 
 
 
V. The Principle of Independence 
 
Pursuant to article 17 of the Presidential Decree all expenditures for executing 
the duties and functions of the Ombudsman Commission will be born by the State 
Secretariat. In other words, the budget of the Ombudsman Commission is part of that 
of the State Secretariat. 
 
Many of the opinion, that the article may distort the independent status of the 
Ombudsman Commission. However, the Ombudsman Commission has so far been 
successful in maintaining its independence from the Executive. It is recorded that the 
Commission send occasionally a critical recommendation to the President. For 
example, President Abdurrahman Wahid apparently did not want to appoint one of the 
two Chief Justice candidates nominated by the Parliament. The Ombudsman 
Commission sent the recommendation reminding that according to the law the 
President had to appoint one of them. Eventually, the President appointed Professor 
Bagir Manan, one of the candidates, as the Chief Justice. 
 
As noted earlier, it is one of the universal principles of ombudsmanship that no 
one or no other institution may intervene, instruct, and dictate Ombudsman.35  Dean 
M Gottehrer points out that the Ombudsman Office is established as independent and 
impartial institution. Even in many Constitutions the principle of independence for the 
Ombudsman is guaranteed. This means that “[t]he Ombudsman in the exercise of the 
office’s functions, duties and responsibilities under this Constitution shall not be 
subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.”36  Any individual 
thus must have easy access to the office. There is even no charge for any grievance 
lodged to the Ombudsman. In addition, Gottehrer comments that “[i]ndependence and 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Supra n. 19a. 
36 Dean M. Gottehrer, “Ombudsman Legislative Resource Document”, Occassional Paper #65, 
(Edmonton, Alberta: International Ombudsman Institute, 1998) 
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impartiality of the Ombudsman are critical to the office’s success because otherwise 
people will tend not to use it if it appears to be another bureaucratic government 
office.”37 
 
Gottehrer is an American expert on ombudsmanship and one of the Indonesian 
Ombudsman Commission’s consultants. In his research report he concludes that 
Constitutions of 54 countries accommodate the basic provisions on the Ombudsman. 
Moreover, he has read not less than 100 Ombudsman Acts of many countries. His 
discoveries show everyone that there are 59 universal principles of ombudsmanship. 
Practically, the Commission has dubbed them “Gottehrer principles”, or “G-
principles”.38 
 
Truly, G-principle 1 (G-1), or the principal of independence is the most 
essential. This principle links with the purpose of its establishment, its sustainability, 
the appointment of Ombudsman, the tenure of office, functions, and procedure of 
removal.39 
 
The purpose of the establishment of Ombudsman Office is to oversee the 
public administration; to promote the standard of competence and efficiencies, to 
protect the individual from being the victim of injustice, maladministration, and abuse 
of discretion committed by any public authority; to promote and protect human rights 
as well. Moreover, the establishment of Ombudsman Office should be based on an 
Act. To repeal and to amend an Act needs a larger majority vote in Parliament. Hence, 
the Act is not easily changed. Further, the Ombudsman must have high qualification 
of personal and moral integrity; and must be capable to analyze problems of law, 
administration, public policy, and human rights (G-2 to G-6). Furthermore, the normal 
term of office may be between four and six years with or without the possibility of 
reappointment for the second term (G-8).  In addition, the Ombudsman must be vested 
with the power to investigate (G-20) and to give recommendation (G-44). Then the 
causes for the removal of the Ombudsman must be specified in the Act inter alia 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Surachman, “Address to”. 
39 Gottehrer, “Ombudsman Legislative”. 
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because of permanent mental or physical inability to execute his functions or because 
of misbehave actions and omissions (G-12). 
 
As Marten Oosting, the past President of International Ombudsman Institute 
(IOI) and former Dutch Ombudsman points out, the independence of ombudsman 
encompasses three elements, namely institutional, functional, and personal 
independence.40 
 
Firstly, institutional independence means the Ombudsman is not part of any 
public agency. Moreover, he holds a high level position in the government system. He 
may not therefore be controlled by any power of authority (G-1). Secondly, functional 
independence means the Ombudsman may not be dictated or pressured by any 
authority or influence. To prevent any intimidation or instruction restricting his 
performance, he must be empowered with wide jurisdiction and flexible procedure by 
an Act (G-20 and G-26). Besides, he must be sustained by sufficient budget to 
promote his professionalism and quality standard in executing his duties and functions 
(G-59). Thirdly, personal independence means he must be a person of high integrity. 
The selection for his position in the office must be based on best qualifications. His 
term of office must be explicitly described in the Act (G-2 to G-6). Likewise, his 
remuneration and facilities must be guaranteed and equal with those of government 
officials of very high echelon (G-9 and G-10). 
 
 
VI. The Principles of Impartiality and Immunity 41 
 
Other pillars of ombudsmanship are the principles of impartiality and 
immunity. In conducting the investigations and in giving the recommendations, the 
Ombudsman must be impartial. Therefore, there are some positions that are 
incompatible for him. For example, he is not eligible to be a member of political party, 
a Member of Parliament, and a judge (G-7). Whenever there is the possibility of 
                                                 
40 Marten Oosting, “Protecting The Integrity And Independence of The Ombudsman Institution: The 
Global Perspective,” in Conference Papers, VIIth International Ombudsman Institute Conference, 
Durban, South Africa, 30 October 2000-2 November 2000, pp.21-22. 
41 Gottehrer, “Ombudsman Legislative”. 
 13
conflict of interest, he must refrain from any case if he has any interest on it (G-14). 
Therefore the Ombudsman may appoint one or two Deputy Ombudsmen who will 
handle such matters.42 
 
Equally important, G-48 states, “The Ombudsman and persons acting under 
the Ombudsman’s direction or authority are immune from civil and criminal 
proceedings for any act performed in good faith under this Act. Ombudsman reports 
and proceedings are privileged.” To this Gottehrer gives his comment: “These 
immunities protect the Ombudsman, staff and anyone else acting under the 
Ombudsman’s direction or authority from harassment when dealing with controversial 
issues or making a finding seen as favorable to an unpopular position and from any 
consequences in a libel or slander suit.”43 
 
Not less important as one of the shields for an Ombudsman, his deputy and 
staff is G-47 stating that the conclusions, findings, recommendations and reports of 
the Ombudsman, his deputy and staff may be reviewed by any court except whether 
the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the target groups or over grievances lodged to 
him.44 
 
 
VII. The Future of the National Ombudsman of Indonesia 45 
 
Measured by those international standards, or universal principles of 
ombudsmanship, the present Indonesian Ombudsman Commission is still embryonic 
or prototypic in nature. Even though the Commission has proved to be an independent 
and impartial institution so far, it lacks of essential power for exercising full 
investigation, such as power of subpoena, power of ingress, and other protections or 
shields for his actions. This weakness was surely seen and felt by the Drafter Team. 
                                                 
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid. 
44 Ibid 
45 Cf. Antonius Sujata and RM Surachman, “Preparing the Establishment of A Parliamentary 
Ombudsman: The Indonesian Experience”, paper submitted to the 6th Asian Ombudsman 
Association Conference, Tokyo, Japan 18-21 June 2001. 
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As a result, most of the Gottehrer-principles or International standards and practices 
of ombudsmanship were incorporated into the Draft of the Bill, namely: 
 
The reasons of the establishment and the purpose of the National Ombudsman 
of Indonesia. This is G-principle 1. (See Chapter Two of the Draft of the Bill, Art. 2.) 
 
- The qualifications to be Ombudsman, or G-principle 6. (See Chapter 
Seven, Arts. 31 and 34.) 
- To be independent and impartial, the Ombudsman may not hold any 
incompatible positions, such as a member of political party, a Member 
of Parliament, a judicial officer or a particular public official. This is G-
principle 7. (See Chapters Five, Seven and Eight, Art. 35 jo. Art 1 point 
1; Art. 37 jo. Art. 3 and Art. 13 section (4); and Art 38. jo. Art. 2.) 
- Term of office and the eligibility to be re-elected as seen under G-
principle 8. (See Chapters Seven, Art. 31.) 
- The removal of the Ombudsman based on the incapability, such as 
permanent physic as well as permanent mental illness and misconduct, 
or G-principle 12. (See Chapter Seven, Art. 36 jo. Art. 45.) 
- The Ombudsman shall refrain from investigation or examination of 
cases in which he has an interest in it. The purpose of this G-principle 
14 is to avoid the conflict of interest. (See Chapter Eight, Art. 38.) 
- The authorities of the Ombudsman, or G-principle 20 must be detailed 
in the Acts. (See Chapter Three, Arts 5 to 8.)  
- Ex-officio, or sua sponte investigation, or the authority to initiate the 
investigation without complaints. This is G-principle 20. (See Chapters 
Three and Five, Arts. 6f, 6b, 6g, 8 and 13 section (2).) 
- Who may lodge grievances or reports is G-principle 22. (See Chapter 
Four, Art. 4.) 
- The jurisdictions of the Ombudsman and the categories of public 
agencies and institutions should be described, or G-principle 23. (See 
Chapter Three, Art. 8.) 
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- The categories of grievance and reports. This is G-principle 24. (See 
Chapter Three, Arts. 6 point a, 7 point a, and 11.) Note also the statute 
of limitation, or kadaluwarsa in Indonesian legal term. (See Chapter 
Four, Art. 39 section (3) point e.) 
- The G-principle 25 dealing with the obligation of the Ombudsman to 
keep the grievance and report confidential. (See Chapter Five, Art. 14 
section (3).) 
- The procedure rules starting from the grievances or reports received 
through the investigation processed up to the cases disposed in the form 
of discoveries, conclusions, and recommendations. This is G-principle 
26. (See Chapter Five, Art. 13 to Art. 26.) 
- The access to any public or confidential records is G-principle 34. (See 
Chapters Five, Art. 19 (1).) 
- The power to enter the public premises, or G-principle 37. (See Chapter 
Five, Art. 24.) 
- The power “to summon, to subpoena, to compel production of any 
records and the presence of any person to give testimony under oath” in 
the process of investigation. This is G-principle 38. (See Chapter Five, 
Art. 20.) 
- The authority to give recommendation on the amendment of law to any 
government institutions or legislature, described under G-principle 45. 
(See Chapter Three, Arts. 9 and 10.) 
- The G-principle 48 dealing with the immunity. Since the Commission 
currently won the case when it was sued in the District Court of South 
Jakarta, it is worth being quoted completely here: “The Ombudsman and 
persons acting under the Ombudsman’s direction or authority are 
immune from civil and criminal proceedings for any act performed in 
good faith under this act. Ombudsman reports and proceeding are 
privileged.” (See Chapter Eight, Art. 38 section (3).) 
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Unfortunately, there are some more Gottehrer-principles should be applied 
into the Draft of the Bill. For example, it does not accommodate the following 
principles: 
- The numeration or salary received by the Ombudsman may not be 
diminished and it should be equal to that received by the highest 
government officials such as justices and cabinet ministers. This is G-
principle 10. 
- It is mandatory for the Ombudsman and the staff to take an oath or 
pledge before he assumes his office or they assume their positions. 
These principles are respectively G-principle 11 and G-principle 15. 
- The authority to delegate the power and responsibility of the 
Ombudsman to a staff, or G-principle 16. 
- There will be no cost or charge for anyone who lodges the grievance or 
report. This is G-principle 27. 
- It is an offence to interfere with works of the Ombudsman, or G-
principle 50.  
- Anyone who complaints or reports should be protected from retaliation, 
or G-principle 53. 
- The G-principle 59, or the last principle, dealing with the guarantee that 
the Office of Ombudsman shall have sufficient budget and funds. 
 
The Commission will in due time try to insert those provisions into the final 
Draft of the Bill that is now being prepared by the Parliamentary Commission on 
Legislation (hereinafter referred to as “the Parliamentary Commission”). 
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Closing Remarks46 
 
Meanwhile, the Draft of the Bill on the National Ombudsman of Indonesia has 
been prepared by a small Team consisting of Professor Sunaryati Hartono (Deputy 
Chief Ombudsman), Mr. RM Surachman, APU Research Professor eqv 
(Ombudsman), Mr. Bennemay (Assistant Ombudsman), and Mr. Winarso (Assistant 
Ombudsman). After being socialized through some seminars in Jakarta and several 
provinces, the Draft was submitted to the Department of Justice and Human Rights on 
8 May 2001 with some copies submitted to the Indonesian DPR (Parliament) and to 
the President of the Republic. 
 
As previously pointed out, the drafting of the Bill is one of the mandates of the 
Presidential Decree on the Commission. The accomplishment has been possible by 
the sponsorship of the Asia Foundation in Jakarta, which allocated some funds as part 
of the second year budget granted to the Commission. After the Draft is reviewed by 
the Department of Justice and Human Rights, it will be submitted to the Parliament as 
a Bill. 
 
The Parliamentary Commission, however, invited the Ombudsman 
Commission for the hearing about the Draft on 13 July 2001. On that day the 
Ombudsman Commission gave the clarifications on the background, general 
principles, objective, structure, functions and jurisdictions of the future National 
Ombudsman based on the Draft. In that hearing the Chairman of the Parliamentary 
Commission informed the Ombudsman Commission that the Parliamentary 
Commission is considering to transform the Draft into a Bill and then to submit it to 
the Plenary Meeting of the Parliament as the Bill proposed by its own motion, not 
proposed by the Government (Department of Justice). However, before reaching that 
stage, the Draft will be reviewed for some amendments based on the new inputs 
submitted by the public and by the Ombudsman Commission as well. 
 
One should notice, that the existence of the Ombudsman Commission is to 
create an independent institution, to which nobody may intervene or influence. 
                                                 
46 Quoted almost verbatim from “The 2001 Interim Report of the National Ombudsman Commission”. 
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Nevertheless, the Ombudsman Commission must submit its incidental reports as well 
as annual reports to the President of the Republic, since it was established by a 
Presidential Decree and its Ombudsmen (Commissioners) were appointed and 
inaugurated by the President too. It does not mean, the Ombudsman Commission may 
be intervened or instructed by the Executive, since its main function is just to oversee 
the Government Bureaucracies, Public Institutions, and Public Administration. 
 
As soon as the Bill is enacted, the National Ombudsman will not be a 
Commission anymore. Moreover, the Chief Ombudsman will be elected by the 
Parliament and inaugurated by the Head of State. From that time, Annual Reports will 
be submitted to the Parliament, not to the President. Hence, the Ombudsman 
Commission will become a Parliamentary Ombudsman. Still, it will hold an 
independent and impartial status, with nobody (not even the Parliament) may 
intervene or influence it. In addition, the National Ombudsman will have wider 
jurisdictions and authorities. 
 
Realizing the significant meaning of the Role of the Ombudsman Commission 
in the present situations of Indonesia, all Commissioners (Ombudsmen) will continue 
to execute their mandates with sincere and to the best of their efforts. They are even 
ready to work pro bono publico for the interest of those who feel that they have been 
the victims of maladministration and the victims of injustice as well. 
 
In the meantime, several names will be submitted soon to the President of the 
Republic, Ms. Megawati Soekarnoputri, to be appointed Commisioners (Ombudsmen). 
Pursuant to the Presidential Decree Number 44 Year 2000 the Ombudsman 
Commission should consist of nine persons. To date, there are only five 
Commissioners after the resignation of three Commissioners as mentioned earlier. 
 
With its limited authorities and jurisdiction, the Ombudsman Commission 
continues to execute its functions by preserving its independence and impartiality in 
motivating the target groups to comply with the recommendations for the interest of 
pursuing good governance and fair judiciary in Indonesia. 
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